Review of Kenneth
Dike's Trade and Politics in the
Niger Delta, 1830 - 1885
by
Paul Conton
I was drawn to this book by Fyfe’s revelation, in the preface to his A History of Sierra Leone,
that he had written several hundred pages of his history before he came
across Dike’s book. After reading it he had felt compelled to rewrite
most of what he had written, as Dike led him to see the material in a
new light. If the doyen of Sierra Leone history, Fyfe, could have been
so influenced by Dike that he rewrote several hundred pages of his
masterwork, then I had to have a look at Dike. So, after an internet
search and a long wait I finally was able to get my
hands on a copy of this 1956 publication.
Dike (1917 - 1983) was one of the first Africans to acquire advanced
Western training in history, earning his doctorate from the University
of London after earlier tertiary training at Fourah Bay College (yes,
in those days the top Nigerians came to Sierra Leone to study), and
the Universities of Durham and Aberdeen. He was the first African
professor of history and head of a history department, at the
University of Ibadan, where he later rose to the position of vice
chancellor. He revised the history curriculum at Ibadan to give it an
African focus, and is widely credited with introducing an African
perspective into the study of African history, which hitherto had been
largely recounted through the perspective of the European. The book
under review,
Trade and Politics in the Niger
Delta, 1830 - 1885, published in 1956,
shot him to prominence, inspired a generation of African historians and
influenced Europeans like Fyfe who had previously been dominant in the
study of African history. Africanists have hailed him for rescuing the
history of Africa from white authors and giving the African story a
more sympathetic hearing. His book paints a different picture, one that
Africanists might not like to see. Brutally honest, yet totally
dispassionate, the book reveals a grim, even sordid West African
landscape in the period under survey.
Dike's style is
pedantic, not as down-to-earth or human as Fyfe’s. Dike uses copious
footnotes, where Fyfe eschewed them
altogether, for
which he was roundly criticized.
For the general
reader, such as myself, footnotes and references break the rhythm of
the story and can be conveniently ignored most of the time. The
academic reader, though, will want to know the authority for the
writer's statements and conclusions, and in this arena scholarship is
often judged
by the number of references cited. Fyfe used copious references, but he
deliberately chose to list them at the end, so as not to break the
rhythm of his story. The general reader might be inclined to interpret
copious references as more a sign of weakness than of strength: if the
writer
has the
reader’s confidence (and if not one wonders whether reader would
follow writer for several hundred pages) then writer need not justify
every
assertion with a reference.
Dike divides the history of modern West Africa into two convenient
periods. From 1481, at the Portuguese advent to 1830 Europeans barely
held an inch of West African territory and the African chiefs were
firmly in control. After 1800 a "revolution...swept away...400 year old
political systems built on the slave trade.." Two central spurs of this
revolution were the 1807 prohibition of the slave trade by the British
and the 1830 discovery by the Lander brothers that the Delta region was
the estuary of the mighty Niger river, providing a riverine highway
from the Atlantic into the vast interior.
In the early, pre-1830 period, Dike stresses that
the African chiefs were fully in control of affairs in their
territories and the Europeans were quite happy to involve themselves
only in trading. Once ashore they were absolutely in the control of the
chiefs. Slaves were the main commodity, and Dike maintains not only
that the African chiefs benefited from
the slave trade, something that is perhaps only somewhat
acknowledged in
West African popular opinion, but, much less accepted in the region,
that the political
systems during this four hundred year period had their very foundations
in the slave trade; coastal
chiefs maintained their grip on power by trading slaves to European
slave ships whilst jealously guarding and
restricting access to the hinterland,
from whence the slaves came; interior chiefs shipped down the Niger a
constant supply of slaves captured from a wide area of the hinterland.
Over a 400-year period the political structures evolved to support this
the main export and the main avenue for imported
manufactures. Again and again, Dike makes the point that, "Delta
society...rested on a foundation of slavery" (p. 36).
During the early period when
Europeans involved themselves exclusively with trading, successive
waves of immigration by the interior
peoples had taken place towards the Niger river and to the Delta area
which had previously been sparsely populated. This area became the
principal source in West Africa for slaves, taken via the Niger to
coastal settlements such as Bonny, which thrived on trade with the
white men. The Ijaw people were probably the first to arrive in the
then
sparsely populated Delta, even before the arrival of the first
Portuguese in the fifteenth century. The Ijaw were probably migrants
from the Kingdom of Benin, which was then very powerful and extended
its influence over a large region. Some seeking to escape this
influence sought refuge in the swampy seclusions of the Delta.
After this came Ibo-speaking peoples seeking opportunities for trade
with European seafarers.
The house system was the basic unit of social organization in the
Delta. Each house comprised a master, his relations and a retinue of
slaves which could number up to several thousand depending on the
status of the master. The house conducted trading activities in the
interior and brought export slaves to market on the Delta. Although
there
could be extreme brutality within the system, the house (domestic)
slaves,
according to Dike, were in a better position than export slaves sold to
the
West, for house slaves could and did rise within the system. In the
hinterland, the absolute dominance of the Aro oracle was used to
subjugate the people and provide a mechanism for obtaining slaves in
large quantities. When the
dreaded Aro oracle was reported to have “eaten” miscreants, in
reality they had usually been sold into slavery at the coast.
Whilst his tone is studiously neutral, Dike does not hesitate to lay
all the facts bare, some of which one assumes he would have found
repugnant. For a historian of his
day this was a courageous decision. It would be even today, when
knowledge of the extent of African involvement in the slave trade is
not widespread
among the general population and calls for reparations from the West
are active. At every stage Dike documents how the Niger
Delta chiefs actively participated in the trade, profited handsomely
from it and
based entire political structures throughout this vast region upon it.
He reveals the opposition by the African chiefs to the British decision
to ban the slave trade and the cynicism of both parties,
European buyer and African seller. The British government emerges as
the unlikely, unsung hero, deciding in 1807 not only
to ban the trade, but to actively pursue development of alternative,
legitimate trade. This decision engendered a fierce struggle lasting
for many years. Several candidates for legitimate trade (ivory, gold
dust etc), proved to
be unsuitable, but ultimately palm oil emerged successful. The two
sides, slave traders and legitimate traders, were mortal enemies and
could not survive side by side. In some areas,
whenever a slaving ship showed up, all legitimate trade ceased and
locals concentrated on filling up the slaver with its illegitimate
cargo. Violent confrontations between the two sides were common, with
the British Navy active on the high seas to proscribe the trade.
Not having a suitable nearby site on the mainland, the British Navy
found
Fernando Po an important base from which to operate. In the late
thirties the British government sought to establish anti-slave-trading
treaties with the coastal states. In a power struggle in Bonny, the
center of the slave trade, the British intervened to restore King
Pepple to power, marking
the beginning of the end of independence for the coastal states.
Numerous treaties followed, accompanied by
payments to chiefs for the specific purpose of ending the slave trade.
At one
point in 1841 Dike shows (p. 85) King Pepple bargaining successfully
for an
annual payment of 10,000 pounds sterling to end slave trading in his
country.
Eventually, legitimate trade
won over illegitimate. In the legitimate trade again
the Delta region became key in West Africa. Just as it had produced
slaves from deep in the African hinterland via the Niger, so its
entrepreneurs scoured the swamps and river banks of the hot,
humid
Delta basin for the native crop. Domestic Delta
slaves were again heavily involved in getting
the new export commodity to the coast. Like the earlier export, palm
kernels were
brought to coastal ports from
a wide region of the Delta via the Niger. This period saw the continued
dominance of
the Delta coastal states, Bonny preeminent among them, each with
trading
outposts up the numerous creeks and rivers protected by fleets of
heavily armed war canoes dispatched from the Delta.
The struggle between the slave trade and
legitimate trade was followed in the 1830s by a struggle between the
old order of coastal trading through which the coastal states had
grown rich and a new order which sought direct trade with the
hinterland. Expeditions up the Niger were organised by Macgregor Laird
to establish the
viability of direct trading in legitimate products with the hinterland.
These expeditions
were met by violent but ultimately unsuccessful opposition from
supporters of the old order.
The 1850s and 1860s saw the rise of British power in the region
and the revolt of the domestic Delta slaves. Even though the
British had worked hard to eliminate the Atlantic slave trade and
replace it with trade in palm oil, there still existed in the Delta
region an extensive slave system. Indeed it was slaves who
primarily worked the plantations that produced the palm oil for the new
export trade. An extensive class and caste system governed the region
with
hereditary rulers at the top supported by the wealthy heads of Houses
that controlled the slave classes. As the British gradually came to
dominate affairs on the Delta coast, best illustrated by their removal
of the powerful King Pepple of Bonny and of the ancient Pepple dynasty,
so the slaves gradually began to revolt against the Delta city-states
and the system that kept them in servitude. Ex-slaves, initially a
subservient
class, gradually began to vie for political power within the House
system that governed the states. Thus, for example, Chief Madu, an
ex-slave, rose by dint of hard work to become regent in Bonny despite
fierce opposition from the free classes. The revolt of the domestic
Delta slaves was exemplified by the rise of Ja Ja,
an ex-slave who ultimately trumped the kingdom of Bonny and founded his
own state, Opobo.
Perhaps the great merit of
Dike’s book that so influenced Fyfe is
that it so clearly demonstrates that slavery was as much an
internal
African problem as it was a trans-Atlantic one; that it was as much a
black/black confrontation as it was a black/white one; that the
underlying motivation was economic rather than racial. This
coming
from an African writing from Africa at the brink of Independence must
have been revelatory. Dike himself makes no such claims and is content
to restate the facts he has uncovered in his rather dry style without
much comment, as perhaps befits the classic academic historian.
The
rest of us, Fyfe included, are free to add our own interpretations. In
the sixty odd years since Dike’s book was published, his material has
perhaps become even more of a revelation rather than less, as African
popular culture has spun its own tale around the whole sorry
mess. The Africanist would no doubt argue that societies should not be
judged with others' yardsticks. That each society has its own culture,
tradition and system of values, and it can only be judged by these
yardsticks. No one is better or worse than the others. W..e..l..l,
m..m..m..aybe, if it is able to exist in splendid isolation from the
rest of
the world. But once regular contact is made, can any society afford to
ignore events and peoples outside its narrow confines? Can any society
afford not to judge itself against others?
In Dike one finds justification, whether or not intended by the
author, for a position that would be anathema
to his Africanist admirers - that colonial occupation was a necessary
and proper thing in order to sweep away "400-year old political systems
founded on the slave trade." Perhaps the real problem with colonial
occupation was that it didn't do a thorough enough job. In a world
hurtling into modernity, many of the old African political
structures are still in place.