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UNDERSTANDING LAND INVESTMENT DEALS IN SOCFIN LAND INVESTMENT IN SIERRA LEONE LAND DEAL BRIEF | APRIL 2012 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This report was written by Frederic Mousseau with substantial
input from Elke Schaefter of Green Scenery. Anuradha Mittal provided
editorial assistance and contributed to field work. We thank all the local people in Malen Chiefdom who agreed to
share their views and experiences for this research. The views and conclusions expressed in this publication are
those of the Oakland Institute alone and do not reflect opinions of the
individuals and organizations that have sponsored and supported the work. Design: amymade graphic design, amymade@gmail.com, amymade.com Editor: Anuradha Mittal Copy Editor: Granate Sosnoff Photograph Credits © The Oakland Institute Publisher: The Oakland Institute is a policy think tank
dedicated to advancing public participation and fair debate on critical
social, economic, and environmental issues. Green Scenery, a non-governmental
organization in Copyright © 2012 by The Oakland Institute The text may be used free of charge for the purposes of
advocacy, campaigning, education, and research, provided that the source is
acknowledged in full. The copyright holder requests that all such uses be
registered with them for impact assessment purposes. For copying in any other
circumstances, reuse in other publications, or translation or adaptation,
permission must be secured. Please email info@oaklandinstitute.org The Overview In 2011, Socfin Agricultural Company Sierra Leone Ltd. (Socfin
SL) secured 6,500 hectares (ha) of prime farmland for rubber and oil palm
plantations in Malen chiefdom in Pujehun district in the south of Despite this political backing, the Socfin SL investment faces
significant resistance from the local population. In October 2011, 40
protesters were arrested, following tensions between local villagers and
Socfin. The locals were protesting the land deal, criticizing the company’s
lack of transparency, proper consultation, and information regarding
potential resettlement. Protesters also raised issues of inadequate
compensation, corruption, and pressure on land owners and town chiefs to sign
agreements.4 Socfin SL is a subsidiary of the Belgian corporation, Socfin,
(Société Financière des Caoutchoucs), an investment holding company, which
operates in diverse sectors, including plantations, agro-engineering,
banking, finance, and real estate, among others.5 The main shareholder of the company is Bolloré Investissement SA
(Bolloré Group),6
owned by a prominent French businessman, Vincent
Bolloré. Bolloré’s empire has grown dramatically over the past two
decades. By buying up former colonial companies and taking advantage of the
wave of privatization spurred by the “structural adjustments” imposed by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Bolloré has become a key player in the
economic structure and political life of many African countries.7 The Bolloré Group is now present in 92 countries all over the
world, including 43 countries in Africa alone.8 It controls
plantations, industries and services, including shipping, transport
infrastructures, oil production as well as African ports (13 as of 2012).
Bolloré’s grip over the continent is gaining new dimensions as it expands
investments in plantations.9
The grievances made by Sierra Leonean farmers over Socfin’s palm
oil plantations are virtually identical to those made by farming communities
from around the world regarding investments made by other Socfin’s
subsidiaries. Similar practices of land grabs by Socfin subsidiaries and
investment malpractices have been reported in recent years in Smallholder farmers and land owners in Landowners Protesting In early October 2011, on land they claim as their own, over a
hundred landowners started a blockade in Socfin’s area in Malen chiefdom. The
peaceful protest came about after several attempts by land owners to
renegotiate the lease agreement signed by the government. Affected
communities voiced anger at not being properly consulted and cheated on the
land deal that was facilitated by their Paramount Chief, B.V.S. Kebbie. Since the release of the “15” (as they are now regarded) on
October 18, 2011, several court hearings have been set up by the Magistrate
court, but only two were held. Each time hundreds of supporters of the “15”
have poured into the courtroom. On March 3, 2012 the Local Unit Commander of
Pujehun District who ordered the arrest, was slated to testify but he failed
to appear. “The police arrested and beat
up a number of us ...about 38 at that time. Later at night they came into the
village, knocking at the door and taking people forcibly out of their houses.
Some people fled and had to run into the river. The police supervisors
arbitrarily pointed at people and they were arrested and taken to Pujehun. Once in detention, we were
told that we will all rot in prison... Fifteen were left in prison cells and
charged. Our lawyer who represented us was not allowed to post bail and we
spent the night in jail. After which we were transferred to Pujehun. We were
there for eight days in police cells. We were given no food.” – Eddy Kamara, Grievances Against Socfin in The
land leased by Socfin includes between 27 and 30 villages and about 120 land-owning families.11 Upon signing the lease in March 2011,
Socfin agreed to full payments of compensation for the loss of existing
plantations and farms in areas of operation, in addition to an annual payment
of lease rents to land owners. Socfin’s General Manager, Gerben Haringsma,
also made assurances that the company would construct a resident hospital, a
network of roads, schools, and housing facilities, at a cost of $19 million.12 In addition, Socfin made
a commitment to pay $75,000 per year for social development projects and
estimated that job opportunities would be created for 10,000 people with
special preference given to natives of the chiefdom.13 Such promises made to the communities in Pujehun have not
prevented the rise of strong resistance and opposition to the project
locally. In October 2011, the local leadership from the lease area presented
to local authorities a long list of grievances that the population had with
the deal.14 Research by the Oakland Institute and Green Scenery has
identified a number of additional issues of serious concern around the
project. These include:15
1. Lack of proper consultation: some meetings with the local communities took place before the
deal was signed but did not involve all those concerned and left out some key
stakeholders, including councillors, parliamentarians, and many land users
especially women. Furthermore, the investment was initially presented in such
a way that people understood that only a former government plantation would
be leased to the company. On March 5, 2011, a chiefdom meeting for signing
the contract took place but only four representatives out of the nine
sections of Malen signed the document. The contract lease was partly
translated in Mende, the local language, and read to the locals two months
after the contract had been signed. The legality of the contract was
questioned. The Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) report was
also publicly released two months after the signature. “We the land owners were not
consulted on the arrangements and therefore did not know what the agreement
was. So with a consensus we disagreed as land owners. With one voice we said
no! We expressed our unwillingness to give up our lands. But the chief told
us, that he is the sole custodian of the lands and that whatever he says is
final.” – Land owners in Kpumbu,
August 201116 2. Lack of transparency: copies
of the land lease agreement and Memorandum of Understanding were not made
available to land owners and local chiefs, who were told to thumb print or
sign without knowing and understanding the details of the agreement.
Villagers did not know which of the villages would have to be removed,
including villages such as Kortumahun, where the entire land has been leased
to the company. 3. Pressure and intimidation: according
to locals, a local Paramount Chief (the highest traditional authority in the
area), B.V.S. Kebbie intimidated and put pressure on communities and their
representatives to sign documents and repeatedly told them that they would
lose their land without compensation if they didn’t sign. The presence of
armed police at a public meeting in Sahn Malen intimidated local land owners,
who agreed to sign the document. “The chief said whether you
agree or don’t agree they will take the plantation by force.” – Brima Lappia, a 42-year-old
from the 4. Inadequate compensation and rental fees: the lease agreement does not include information or commitments
around resettlement and compensation. Locals rejected the proposed amount of
one million Leones ($220) to compensate every acre of oil palm plantation
lost to the project. It is considered very low compared to the actual value
of the plantations, whereas little or no compensation is offered to other
crops and trees. Many locals also thought that this one-time compensation
payment would be paid on an annual basis. The land lease rent of $5 per acre
a year ($12.50/ha) is seen as a “pittance” by land owners who actually only
receive half of that amount. The other half is divided between local chiefs
and the administration. Moreover, according to the contract, the rent rate
shall be reviewed every 7 years, but this review shall not result in an
increase of more than 17.5%, a ceiling widely considered unfair since the
reality of inflation in “There was never a chance to
say no to the land deal, we felt forced.” – Farmer, Semabu 18 5. Lack of fiscal return: the
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Government of Sierra Leone and
Socfin describes a number of generous fiscal incentives provided to the
company. These include, for instance, a 100% exemption of corporate tax until
2023, to be reduced to a 25% exemption in 2024.19 6. Corruption: locals
accuse the Paramount Chief, B.V.S. Kebbie of using the investment for his own
advantage. They accuse him of having been bribed with a new vehicle in
exchange for his support of the project. 7. Destruction of livelihoods: vital forests and agricultural land are being taken from
communities with little compensation while entire villages will lose their livelihoods
to make room for the plantation. One of the major justifications for the
investment is the creation of employment. Yet the contract has no clause
about employment or provisions to ensure that women and men who have leased
their land would get preferential employment. It is also unknown how many
jobs will actually be created. –
Mammy Thomas, Sanh, direct communication with OI researchers, February 25,
2012 “We particularly asked that wage be raised because the cost of
living is increasing every day and this wage is not enough to support me and
my family. For instance with the present wage of SLL 10,000 [$2.20], when I
buy food to eat during work, I am basically left with nothing for the home.” – Workers’ letter to Gerben Haringsma, Socfin General Manager20 8.
Appalling working conditions: locals hired by the company
describe work conditions as “near-slavery.” They are paid ten thousand Leones
per day ($2.20). They are not provided with medical care when injured or
bitten by snakes. They work six days a week
and are required to report for work each day at 5:30 am to start an eight
hour day of work at 6 am, with a 30 minute lunch break. Employment is
temporary and arbitrary dismissals are common. Workers have sent formal
complaints to the company, asking for better salaries and working conditions.
“The
work has commenced. We are currently working in the nursery. The payment is
250,000 Leones ($50) a month. There is no medical insurance. We asked them to
increase wages so it can take care of medical needs but so far nothing. We
have no toilet facilities, no water. We asked them for water and to provide
sanitation facilities, but they are still to come.” – Mammy Thomas, Sanh, Direct
Communication with OI Researchers, February 25, 2012 “We do brushing, stomping,
removal of palm tress, land preparation. We appealed to the company for
increasing our wages but it has not happened. They increase the number of
hours every day but not wages. If you are late by 10 minutes after lunch you
forfeit your day’s wages.” – Zakaria, Sanh, Direct
Communication with OI Researchers, February 25, 2012 9. Lack of proper
documentation: land owners have not
been given any document or receipt to show the acreage and compensation paid.
All records are kept by the company. Despite its specific mention in the
lease agreement, there is no survey plan attached to the lease and it is
unclear if a plan was ever made available to the relevant stakeholders before
the signing of the agreement. The failure to mark the boundaries of family
land before clearing is a serious concern because it will be impossible for
land owners and their families to identify their land after 50 years (and 21
years of possible extension). The long length of the lease together with the
lack of proper documentation and marking is likely to make the lease
permanent. 10. Destruction of biodiversity: though the company is making an inventory of existing genetic
resources, it is unclear how it will prevent the loss of biodiversity as a
result of the large-scale monoculture of palm oil plantations. Essential
resources for the local populations, including plants and wildlife, are at
risk. 11. Water resources under threat: clause #3 of the MOU between the Government of Sierra Leone and
the company21 states that “there will be no restriction on the volume of water
extracted by SAC [Socfin] from rivers, other watercourses, wells and
boreholes.” The agreement further indicates that water will be paid at 3
Leones ($0.0007) per cubic meter, with no indication of how water use will be
measured and accounted for. 12. Irregularities and legal flaws of the lease agreement: in-depth review of the lease agreements signed with Socfin,22 found major inconsistencies and a failure to comply with the
country’s existing legal framework. For instance, even if the lessor obtained
the consent, it was clearly not informed consent. The review also identifies
several legal procedures Rising Returns for Bolloré Group’s Plantations32 Groupe Socfin (former-Socfin Group): Bolloré owns 39% of
Socfin, which manages 150,000 hectares of plantations in Asia and • • Okomu, Nigeria: 15,600 hectares of rubber trees and palm oil, net
profit of $23.4 million in 2011, sevenfold increase from $3.1 million in
2009. • Socapalm Cameroon: 31,500 hectares of rubber trees and palm oil, and
Ferme Suisse (refinery), net profit of $16.9 million in 2011, up from
$12.6 million in 2009. • LAC, • •
SOGB, •
New developments: creation of 12,000 hectares of rubber
plantations in Cambodia (1,700 hectares already planted); 5,000 hectares
of palm oil in Democratic Republic of Congo and 12,000 hectares in Sierra
Leone. Safa
Bolloré
Group’s Net Profits from Plantations in Asia and Increase
2011/2009: $163 million (187%) and regulations related to land
deals in the country, which were violated by the Socfin agreement. The
analysis concluded that the signed lease agreements are in effect voidable
due to “legal inconsistencies” and recommended “a thorough review and
amendment of both the lease and the sub-lease agreement under integration of
independent (international) legal experts to support local communities in
defining and expressing their expectations and concerns.”23 Dispossession and Malpractices Fuel Resistance to Bolloré’s
Investments around the World Through a complex structure of subsidiaries, the Bolloré Group’s
Socfin operates rubber and oil palm plantations in Socfin claims that it is committed to the principles &
criteria of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO).24 These include transparency, compliance with applicable laws and
regulations, responsible consideration of employees, individuals and
communities, environmental responsibility, and conservation of natural
resources and biodiversity.25
Yet the reality on the ground, in Sierra Leone as
in other countries, contradicts this commitment. In recent years, Socfin and Bolloré Group’s notoriety for
wrongdoing around the world has grown. Investment malpractices have been
reported from several countries including In December 2010, a group of NGOs (Sherpa, CED, FOCARFE, and
MISEREOR) filed a complaint with OECD against a Socfin subsidiary, the
Société Camerounaise de Palmeraies (SOCAPALM), which operates five oil palm plantations
in The expansion of SOCAPALM’s operations has allegedly diminished
the size and the availability of public services and natural resources for
local communities. Moreover, local villagers have reported physical abuse by
SOCAPALM’s security services, Africa Security.27 The complainants also allege that SOCAPALM’s treatment of
plantation workers constitutes a breach of the OECD guidelines.
Precarious work is rampant, and freedom of association is limited.
Additionally, the housing facilities are deplorable, and dividends promised
to employees, when SOCAPALM was privatized in 2000, were never paid. The
complaint also claims that SOCAPALM has breached the guidelines disclosure
chapter by failing to properly disclose relevant information about the
company and potential environmental risks.28 The French, Belgian, and Luxembourgian holding companies
Bolloré, Financière du champ de Mars, SOCFIN, and Intercultures exert joint
control over SOCAPALM’s operations in In 2010, the World Rainforest Movement (WRM) reported that
SOCAPALM was expanding its operations without regard for neighboring
ecosystems, thus seriously endangering the food security of local
populations. WRM warned about the pollution caused by the agrochemical
products used on the monoculture plantations and the waste effluents
discharged by a factory in Kienké, drastically contaminating the area’s
waterways. WRM also reported abominable living and working conditions on the
plantations: insalubrious living quarters and shared latrines; lack of
regular access to water and electricity; and mostly temporary employment at
miserable wages with no social security coverage or adequate protection.30 This situation led to numerous strikes and protests. In 2007,
when a resistance movement against these labor practices emerged, its leader
was immediately arrested, and the authorities let him know that “if he kept
it up he was going to get killed.”31 In 2008, SOCFIN KCD secured a concession for a rubber tree
plantation in Cambodia.33
In December 2008, hundreds of peasant farmers from
the Bunong ethnic group joined together to protest the company. Like most of In October 2011, a coalition of international rights groups
joined the indigenous groups. They challenged that the 7,000 hectares of land
concessions granted to Socfin’s subsidiary and its local partner flouted
Cambodian law, left villagers impoverished, and destroyed spiritual
areas and burial sites. The human rights groups demanded that Socfinasia SA
cease work at its rubber concession in eastern In October 2011, the International Federation of Human Rights
(FIDH) observed that “Socfin-KCD has failed to comply with its responsibility
to respect human rights. Given the Cambodian political context, and the high
level of corruption, Socfin-KCD could not ignore the context in which they
operate and should therefore have conducted due diligence processes to
adequately assess potential adverse risks their operations may cause. The
company should have conducted adequate social and environmental impact
assessments and consulted with affected indigenous people. Once aware of the
violations taking place, Socfin-KCD failed to take all necessary measures to
ensure violations would cease and to adapt its compensation process and work
policies to ensure respect of economic, social and cultural rights of the
Bunong.”35 While pursuing its activities, in November 2011, Socfin KCD
denied all the allegations made by FIDH and threatened the federation of a
lawsuit for defamation.36
In Movement, LAC is “to be blamed for deforestation at a big scale”
in Liberia.37 In May 2006, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)
published a report that described the dire human rights situation on the
plantation: child workers under the age of 14, the massive use of
subcontracting, the use of carcinogenic products, the quashing of trade
unions, arbitrary dismissals, the maintenance of order through private
militias, and the eviction of 75 villages and 400,000 peasant farmers from
their homes to allow the expansion of the plantation area.38 LAC labeled UNMIL’s findings as “outright blatant fabrications”
and “excessive exaggerations.”39
Several years after the UN report, no action has
been taken by the company or the government in response to UNMIL’s
accusations. The government’s inaction has been used by LAC as evidence of
its good practices and to rebut UNMIL’s allegations.40 LAC contemplated legal action against UNMIL but finally
refrained from starting a lawsuit because of the high probability of UNMIL’s
immunity from a court process in Liberia.41 Criminalizing Dissent to
Silence Criticism While farmers await trial in A few months later, the Group dropped a related case for
defamation against a freelance photographer Isabelle Alexandra Ricq,
following an interview in which she talked about the problems she had
witnessed on SOCAPALM oil palm plantations and the surrounding area in “Bolloré has other means at its disposal to influence public
opinion in its favour. It is the main shareholder in the advertising giant,
Havas, the world’s sixth largest global communications group and leading
advertiser in numerous publications. Bolloré also owns the television network
Direct 8 and two free newspapers, Direct Soir and Direct Matin. Obviously,
the readers of these newspapers will learn absolutely nothing about the
criticisms aimed at Vincent Bolloré’s business dealings in –French
economic group Bolloré attempts to intimidate journalists who expose abusive
practices on its plantations in Bolloré and Socfin’s Complex
Web of Companies and Interests Socfin was created in 1959 with headquarters in The set-up of the company involves a complex web of companies
and interests, including cross holdings and companies based in tax havens
such as Due to the complex and multi-layered structure of holding
companies involved, it is difficult to assess precisely the degree of control
exercised by Bolloré Group on various Socfin subsidiaries. However, Bolloré
Group is Socfin’s main shareholder and Vincent Bolloré, as the CEO of the
Group, sits on the boards of Socfin and other subsidiaries. This would suggest
that Bolloré exercises significant operational and financial control over the
joint venture.47 Vincent Bolloré, an Investor
with an Octopus Reach in The Bolloré Group is currently one of the world’s top 500
companies, with an annual turnover of more than seven billion Euros. Its
global expansion has been largely concentrated in In recent years, Bolloré Group has entered the media market,
including TV, newspapers, and film production (it sold two Figure 1: Bolloré Group’s Activities in Africa, Asia and TV channels at the end of 2011). The Bolloré Group has had no
qualms about working closely with dictators like Denis Sassou Nguesso in Bolloré Africa Logistics controls over 13 African ports,
including a 20-year concession of the Conclusion Numerous legal flaws, the lack of transparency, adequate documentation,
and proper consultation demonstrate that Socfin’s land deal in Sierra Leone
has gone ahead without free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) of land
owners. The principle of FPIC is clearly stipulated in the guidelines
produced in March 2010 by the Sierra Leone Investment and Export Promotion
Agency (SLIEPA), the government agency which has been
instrumental in facilitating foreign investment deals in It is critical that Socfin’s deal is urgently reviewed. Trans-parency,
adequate documentation, and proper consultation are required to give people a
say in the future of land and natural resources that are essential for their
livelihoods. The publication of a comprehensive Environmental, Social and
Health Impact Assessment and a land survey is necessary to give communities
the basic information required to negotiate the conditions and terms of any
agreement, and the ability to reject it. Through complex financial and institutional set-ups, involving
different companies with different names and structures, the Bolloré Group is
involved in a number of agricultural investments, which, as in By expanding its presence in both production and transport, the
Bolloré Group is developing a model of integration, one that covers a range
of activities geared toward the extraction of natural resources from
developing countries, particularly in 1 Green Scenery, “The Socfin
Land Deal Missing Out On Best Practices,” fact-finding mission to Malen
Chiefdom, Pujehun District, Sierra Leone, May 2011. 2 Sublease between the
Minister of Agriculture Dr. Sam Sesay and Socfin SL Agricultural Company
Limited, March 5, 2011. 3 Ibid. 4 Malen Land Owners Association
(MALOA), “Grievances of Land Owners in Malen Chiefdom,” letter to the
district officer, Malen Chiefdom, Pujehun District, Sierra Leone, October 2,
2011. 5 For more information on the
company visit www.socfin.com/. 6 According to Socfin website,
Bolloré controls about 39%of Socfin https://www.
socfin.com/Public/Statements_page.php?ID=945&ancestor1=1052&ancest
or2=1709, accessed March 19, 2012 . 7 World Rainforest Movement,
“French economic group Bolloré attempts to intimidate journalists who expose
abusive practices on its plantations in 8 Bolloré Group Annual Report
2010, March 2011, accessed March 17, 2012. 9 World Rainforest Movement,
“French economic group.” 10 See “Rights groups say
rubber producer must halt work over disputed land,” Deutsche
Presse-Agentur, October 6, 2011, https://www.monstersandcritics.com/ news/asiapacific/news/article_1667051.php/Rights-groups-say-rubber-producer-must-halt-work-over-disputed-land,
accessed March 17, 2012; and OECD Watch, “Environmental and labour violations
at SOCAPALM in Cameroon,” https:// oecdwatch.org/cases-fr/Case_200/view?set_language,
accessed March 17, 2012. 11
Green Scenery, “The 12 “SOCFIN Agricultural
Company set to establish $100 million oil project in Malen chiefdom,” Awoko,
March 11, 2011, https://www.awoko.org/2011/03/11/ socfin-agricultural-company-set-to-establish-100-million-oil-project-in-malen-chiefdom/,
accessed March 17, 2012. 13 Gerben Haringsma, interview
by Green Scenery, August 5, 2011. 14 15 The information is based on
Oakland Institute research, as well as Malen Land Owners Association (MALOA)
“Grievances of Land Owners in Malen Chiefdom,” letter to the District
Officer, Malen Chiefdom, Pujehun District, October 2, 2011; Green Scenery,
“The Socfin Land Deal Missing Out On Best Practices,” fact-finding mission to
Malen Chiefdom, Pujehun District, Sierra Leone, May 2011; and Green Scenery
unpublished research, August 2011. 16 Green Scenery, unpublished
research, August 2011. 17 “Tempers rise over oil palm
in 18 In Green Scenery,
unpublished research August 2011. 19 Memorandum of Understanding
between the Government of Sierra Leone and 2011 Socfin Agricultural Company
Sierra Leone Ltd. (Socfin SL), March 2011. 20 In Green Scenery,
unpublished research August 2011. 21 Ibid. 22 Legal analysis of the lease
agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the tribal authorities
of the Malen Chiefdom Pujehun District, Southern Province of the Republic of
Sierra Leone and the sublease agreement between the Government of Sierra
Leone and the Socfin Agricultural Company SL Limited, provided by Patrick N.
Johnbull, 2011. 23 Ibid. 24 Socfin website,
https://www.socfin.com/Public/NewsInTreePage.php?ID=1862&
ancestor1=1051&ancestor2=1392, accessed March 16, 2012. 25 Misereor, CED, Sherpa, The
Impact of the Privatization of SOCPALM on Communities and the Environment in
Cameroon, briefing paper, December, 2010. 26 OECD
Watch, “Sherpa et al vs. Bolloré,” https://oecdwatch.org/cases-fr/
Case_200/view?set_language, accessed March 17, 2012. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 World Rainforest Movement, “French economic group.” 31 Ibid. 32 Bollore Group, Résultats 2010, 15 Mars 2011,
https://129.35.163.139/bollore_ web/publication_555_fr.pdf, accessed January
29, 2012; Bollore Group, Résultats 2011, 22 Mars 2012,
https://129.35.163.139/bollore_web/publication_678_fr.pdf, accessed March 29
2012. 33 To learn moree about who is behind the joint venture of
Socfin KCD, please visit “ 34 See “Rights groups say rubber producer must halt work over
disputed land,” October 6, 2011, Deutsche Presse-Agentur,
https://www.monstersandcritics. com/news/asiapacific/news/article_1667051.php/Rights-groups-say-rubber-producer-must-halt-work-over-disputed-land,
accessed March 17, 2012; also see International Federation of Human Rights
(FIDH), “Land Cleared for Rubber, Rights Bulldozed,”
https://www.fidh.org/Land-cleared-for-Rubber-Rights, accessed December 11,
2011. 35 Federation of Human Rights, (FIDH), “ 36 Hubert Fabri, President of Soc Fin’s Board of Directors,
letter to International Federation of Human Rights, (FIDH), November 10,
2011, available at https://
www.fidh.org/spip.php?action=telecharger&arg=5697, accessed February 23,
2012. 37 World Rainforest Movement, “ 38 United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), Human Rights in
39 “UNMIL’s Report on Human Rights at Liberia Agricultural
Company ‘LAC’ LAC’s Version,” 2008, https://www.socfin.com/Files/media/News/
INTERCULTURES_S.A./Unmill_Report_LACs_version.pdf, accessed March16, 2012. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 World Rainforest Movement, “French economic group.” 43 Ibid. 44 Socfin website,
https://www.socfin.com/Public/Statements_page.php?ID=945&
ancestor1=1052&ancestor2=1709, accessed March 19, 2012. 45 International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH), “Land
Cleared for Rubber, Rights Bulldozed,”
https://www.fidh.org/Land-cleared-for-Rubber-Rights, accessed December 11,
2011. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Thomas Deltombe, “Les guerres africaines de Vincent Bolloré,”
Le Monde Diplomatique, April 2009. 49 Ibid. 50 World Rainforest Movement, “French economic group.” 51 “Batailles pour le contrôle des ports africains,” Eburnienews,
November 25, 2011. 52 “Bolloré: monopoles services compris,” Survie,
https://survie.org/francafrique/
diplomatie-business-et-dictatures/article/bollore-monopoles-services-compris-170,
accessed March 17, 2012. 53 Ibid. 54
Socfin website, https://www.socfin.com/Public/Menu.php?ID=1051, accessed March
16, 2012. |
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