Rice, the experts tell us, Oryza sativa (Asian rice),
originated
in China thousands of years ago. From there it slowly spread across
the world, reaching Africa and joining its African cousin, Oryza glaberrima, some time before
the Portuguese arrived
there in the fifteenth century. In the seventeenth century, so the
story goes, it was taken to North America and introduced to the US
state of South Carolina. Initially the rice was planted on
higher, dry ground (so-called uplands), but it was soon discovered that
rice did much better in wet areas and planting, by black slaves who
brought rice-growing skills from the West coast of Africa, was
transferred to lowland, swampy areas. According to the South Carolina
Encyclopedia,
Here, Carolina rice became famous and by the 1770s rice exports to Europe grew to 30,000 tons. The work was arduous and unhealthy, in the waterlogged, mosquito-ridden swamps of the Carolinas and there was fearsome mortality among the slaves, but plentiful profits for the white slave masters. South Carolina's wealth was built on this industry. Then in 1883 the North won the American civil war and slavery was abolished. Overnight, the profitable Carolina rice industry was jeopardized.
But American agriculture refused to
give up, and bounced back some
decades later with a new rice model. Rather than using labor-intensive
techniques on difficult, swampy land, rice farmers shifted to
irrigation on firmer, flatter land, on which larger, heavier
agricultural equipment could be used. Production shifted from the
rain-fed, low-lying swamps of Carolina to expansive lands in
California, Arkansas and other states. Individual farms now were
hundreds of acres in size, with each farmer having massive
combine harvesters and other expensive capital equipment to the
tune of hundreds of thousands of dollars. It's perhaps not generally
appreciated in West Africa that the USA is a big player in the
international rice market. The US is not in the top 10 producers of
rice in the world, but because it produces
far more rice than it consumes it is the 5th or 6th largest rice
exporter accounting
for more than 10 percent of the annual volume of global rice trade. But it
exports mainly to markets close to home or
those where it has special trade agreements, such as NAFTA, with
Mexico and Canada.
Meanwhile,
the Asian farmer has continued very competitive on his
swamp
land with small plots of a few acres in size, steadily increasing his
yield since the 1960s. The American farmer is
still more productive (>8 Metric Tons per hectare compared to >4
MT/ha
for the Asian) and can in good years earn a great deal more, although
he also faces the risk of huge losses in bad years. Overall, the Asian
farmer, with lower earnings, is more competitive in distant markets
like West Africa than is the American. And this is why we see much
Asian (Thai, Burmese, Vietnamese etc) rice on the free market in West
Africa but very little American (No, PL480 doesn't count). In some ways
this appears anomalous and counter-intuitive. We might expect the
producer with the greater capitalization to be more efficient and
competitive. But high American labour costs and huge interest costs on
expensive American farm equipment mean the Asian farmer can offer a
lower-priced product. This would perhaps make an interesting economic
case study - How does one determine the optimum level of farm capital
equipment in different economies? And what is the best way to assess
profit. Per farmer? (America wins) Per hectare of land ?
(uncertain
winner). Per kg of rice produced ? (Asia wins). And does this mean that
Asia could eventually capture the entire market?
Rice, by dint of its sheer global size, is a political commodity as well as a fiercely competitive commercial one. The US government like other governments seeks to protect its rice farmers and overseas rice markets and negotiates trade agreements that include favorable provisions for its domestic rice industry. It also provides price supports (subsidies) for rice farmers when world prices fall below a certain threshold. Asian governments may similarly provide subsidies for their farmers. It's a dynamic competitive business, driven not just by the free market but also by the dictates of governments. In the 2007-08 rice crisis, importing, exporting and producing countries scrambled to respond to a world shortage and to ensure sufficient supplies to feed their populations.
The American experience provides salutary lessons for West Africa. In the face of competition and then the changed environment after the Civil War, American rice production was forced to shift technologically and physically, first from upland to lowland and then to irrigated land hundreds of miles away. This was the only way for the industry to remain competitive. Even with massive investments in capital equipment, American rice still struggles to compete with Asian swamp rice. In West Africa, where millions of farmers toil away at upland rice farming, sometimes with yields less than 1 MT/ ha, and even those on swamp lands achieve considerably lower yields than the Asians, we are doomed to agricultural poverty unless we effect a shift in direction as radical as the US rice industry managed to achieve. It's easy to calculate the West African farmer's rice surplus/deficit. Assume a farmer with a family of six. In the high-rice-consumption West African countries (Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau), the family's annual domestic rice consumption is approximately 600 Kg. Assume the family farms a 1 ha (2.5 acres approx) plot with yields less than 1 MT/ha. The entire rice output is barely sufficient for the family's internal consumption, never mind all the other expenses with which the family would be faced. Consider the same family in Asia, achieving yields of 4 MT/ha. There is a comfortable surplus that can be sold, perhaps for eventual export, to meet other needs.
West Africa does have at least one example of the change that is needed. Mali's Office du Niger was created by the French colonial authorities for the purpose of managing an irrigated agricultural scheme fed from the river Niger. Initially established for cotton growing, and not without its trials over the years, the Office du Niger now focusses on rice production. The area under irrigation (<100,000 ha) is not sufficient to make a really big impact on Mali's economic situation, but according to FAO statistics rice yields have been achieved in Mali comparable to those in Asia. And despite being a medium-rice-consumption country, Mali has the lowest per-capita rice imports in West Africa. Importantly, the rice is being produced by indigenes working on land to which they have some property rights. A social revolution would be needed to replicate these results throughout West Africa. There are only two forces on earth capable of achieving such a herculean task: Government and the free market, preferably working in tandem.
"By
the 1720s a rice industry had begun to develop.
Production became better established and systematic, and cultivation
relocated
from “high” ground to inland, freshwater swamps, where rudimentary
water-control mechanisms—such as impoundments—could be employed. After
1750 the
locus of production shifted again, this time to drained swamps on or
adjacent
to South Carolina’s major tidal rivers. The so-called tidal rice zone,
which
was to constitute the heart of the lowcountry rice industry, developed
within
narrow geographical and hydrological limits."
Here, Carolina rice became famous and by the 1770s rice exports to Europe grew to 30,000 tons. The work was arduous and unhealthy, in the waterlogged, mosquito-ridden swamps of the Carolinas and there was fearsome mortality among the slaves, but plentiful profits for the white slave masters. South Carolina's wealth was built on this industry. Then in 1883 the North won the American civil war and slavery was abolished. Overnight, the profitable Carolina rice industry was jeopardized.
Meanwhile for decades Asian rice planters had
steadily
been building up their
production and export capability on similar swampy areas fed by
torrential Asian
monsoons. After the emancipation of American slaves the Asians
supplanted American production and the Carolina
rice industry ground to a halt.
But American agriculture refused to
give up, and bounced back some
decades later with a new rice model. Rather than using labor-intensive
techniques on difficult, swampy land, rice farmers shifted to
irrigation on firmer, flatter land, on which larger, heavier
agricultural equipment could be used. Production shifted from the
rain-fed, low-lying swamps of Carolina to expansive lands in
California, Arkansas and other states. Individual farms now were
hundreds of acres in size, with each farmer having massive
combine harvesters and other expensive capital equipment to the
tune of hundreds of thousands of dollars. It's perhaps not generally
appreciated in West Africa that the USA is a big player in the
international rice market. The US is not in the top 10 producers of
rice in the world, but because it produces
far more rice than it consumes it is the 5th or 6th largest rice
exporter accounting
for more than 10 percent of the annual volume of global rice trade. But it
exports mainly to markets close to home or
those where it has special trade agreements, such as NAFTA, with
Mexico and Canada. Meanwhile,
the Asian farmer has continued very competitive on his
swamp
land with small plots of a few acres in size, steadily increasing his
yield since the 1960s. The American farmer is
still more productive (>8 Metric Tons per hectare compared to >4
MT/ha
for the Asian) and can in good years earn a great deal more, although
he also faces the risk of huge losses in bad years. Overall, the Asian
farmer, with lower earnings, is more competitive in distant markets
like West Africa than is the American. And this is why we see much
Asian (Thai, Burmese, Vietnamese etc) rice on the free market in West
Africa but very little American (No, PL480 doesn't count). In some ways
this appears anomalous and counter-intuitive. We might expect the
producer with the greater capitalization to be more efficient and
competitive. But high American labour costs and huge interest costs on
expensive American farm equipment mean the Asian farmer can offer a
lower-priced product. This would perhaps make an interesting economic
case study - How does one determine the optimum level of farm capital
equipment in different economies? And what is the best way to assess
profit. Per farmer? (America wins) Per hectare of land ?
(uncertain
winner). Per kg of rice produced ? (Asia wins). And does this mean that
Asia could eventually capture the entire market?Rice, by dint of its sheer global size, is a political commodity as well as a fiercely competitive commercial one. The US government like other governments seeks to protect its rice farmers and overseas rice markets and negotiates trade agreements that include favorable provisions for its domestic rice industry. It also provides price supports (subsidies) for rice farmers when world prices fall below a certain threshold. Asian governments may similarly provide subsidies for their farmers. It's a dynamic competitive business, driven not just by the free market but also by the dictates of governments. In the 2007-08 rice crisis, importing, exporting and producing countries scrambled to respond to a world shortage and to ensure sufficient supplies to feed their populations.
The American experience provides salutary lessons for West Africa. In the face of competition and then the changed environment after the Civil War, American rice production was forced to shift technologically and physically, first from upland to lowland and then to irrigated land hundreds of miles away. This was the only way for the industry to remain competitive. Even with massive investments in capital equipment, American rice still struggles to compete with Asian swamp rice. In West Africa, where millions of farmers toil away at upland rice farming, sometimes with yields less than 1 MT/ ha, and even those on swamp lands achieve considerably lower yields than the Asians, we are doomed to agricultural poverty unless we effect a shift in direction as radical as the US rice industry managed to achieve. It's easy to calculate the West African farmer's rice surplus/deficit. Assume a farmer with a family of six. In the high-rice-consumption West African countries (Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau), the family's annual domestic rice consumption is approximately 600 Kg. Assume the family farms a 1 ha (2.5 acres approx) plot with yields less than 1 MT/ha. The entire rice output is barely sufficient for the family's internal consumption, never mind all the other expenses with which the family would be faced. Consider the same family in Asia, achieving yields of 4 MT/ha. There is a comfortable surplus that can be sold, perhaps for eventual export, to meet other needs.
West Africa does have at least one example of the change that is needed. Mali's Office du Niger was created by the French colonial authorities for the purpose of managing an irrigated agricultural scheme fed from the river Niger. Initially established for cotton growing, and not without its trials over the years, the Office du Niger now focusses on rice production. The area under irrigation (<100,000 ha) is not sufficient to make a really big impact on Mali's economic situation, but according to FAO statistics rice yields have been achieved in Mali comparable to those in Asia. And despite being a medium-rice-consumption country, Mali has the lowest per-capita rice imports in West Africa. Importantly, the rice is being produced by indigenes working on land to which they have some property rights. A social revolution would be needed to replicate these results throughout West Africa. There are only two forces on earth capable of achieving such a herculean task: Government and the free market, preferably working in tandem.